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That REASON, PASSION answer one great aim; 
That true SELF-LOVE and SOCIAL are the same; 
That VIRTUE only makes our BLISS below; 
And all our knowledge is: OURSELVES TO KNOW. 
 
Pope, Essay on Man, IV, 395-398 
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A. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF SELF-INTEREST 
In his 2013 judgment in Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation Ltd,
1
 Leggatt J 
put forward the most substantial and interesting review of the English doctrine of agreement 
to be found in the modern case law. It claimed that contract law institutionalised a spectrum 
of other-regarding, moral duties which cluster around the concept of good faith, and that it 
therefore may be wise for the English law to explicitly recognise good faith. Not all of these 
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duties will obtain in every contract, but some, notably the duty of honesty, should.
2
 I have 
elsewhere analysed the detail of Leggatt J’s judgment and in particular the alternative ways in 
which good faith might be recognised in the English law.
3
 I wish to put this to one side in 
order to focus on the logically prior claim that the law of contractual agreement 
institutionalises other-regarding, moral duties. Even if this claim is allowed, it leaves entirely 
open the possible form of the legal recognition of good faith. 
 A decision of the High Court, such authority as Yam Seng might exercise could largely 
be only persuasive and, in brief, its treatment of good faith
4
 has not been found very 
persuasive on the more or less score of occasions it has been at least mentioned in the higher 
courts of England and Wales.
5
 The principal result
6
 of its consideration by the Court of 
Appeal has been the drawing of a distinction between the interpretation and the implication of 
good faith. Whilst the parties may stipulate a duty of good faith which should be recognised 
as a matter of interpretation, in the absence of such stipulation a duty of good faith should not 





  Ibid [135]-[137]. Leggatt J’s language seems to leave open the possibility of there being some cases in 
which the duty of honesty does not obtain but doing so, it is respectfully submitted, is inconsistent with his 
core claim. That empirically there are contracts which purport to exclude liability for dishonesty is of course 
the case. 
3
  D Campbell, “Good faith and the ubiquity of the ‘relational’ contract” (2014) 77 MLR 475. See further text 
accompanying n 115. 
4
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Ltd v Intelligent Data Capture Ltd [2014] EWHC 2145 (Ch) and  D  and G Cars Ltd v Essex Police 
Authority [2015] EWHC 226 (QB). See further H Collins, “Is a relational contract a legal concept?” in S 
Degeling et al (eds), Contract and Commercial Law (forthcoming 2017) .  
5
  A judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada was pronouncedly sympathetic: Bhasin v Hrynew [2015] 4 
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Seng and Bhasin” [2015] JBL 420. 
6
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(Councils) Ltd v McGregor [1962] AC 413), was reversed. See further J Morgan, “Smuggling mitigation 
into White and Carter v McGregor: Time to come clean?” [2015] LMCLQ 575. On subsequent 
developments in the law of termination which “may mark a further limitation on the willingness of English 
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 As stated, this distinction is, with respect, not securely founded. Citing the already 
famous dictum of Lord Neuberger PSC (Lords Sumption and Hodge JJSC concurring) in 
Marks and Spencer v BNP Paribas, the Court of Appeal told us that: 
whatever the broad similarities between them, [interpretation and implication] are 
‘different processes governed by different rules’ … because ‘the implication of 
contract terms involves a different and altogether more ambitious undertaking: 
the interpolation of terms to deal with matters for which, ex hypothesi, the parties 
themselves have made no provision’.8 
This is to claim that, if one is not implying good faith, one is not implying. This is not so. 
Instead of implying that the parties intentions were formed on the basis of (and therefore 
should be interpreted against) an attitude which Leggatt J sought to capture by reference to 
good faith, the distinction between interpretation and implication actually does imply, in the 
absence of a stipulation of good faith, that the parties’ intentions were formed on the basis of 
(and therefore should be interpreted against) an attitude of self-interest. In the House of Lords 
judgment in Walford v Miles which is regarded as the definitive modern statement of this 
attitude, Lord Ackner (with whom all their Lordships concurred) said that:  
the concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently 
repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when involved in negotiations. 
Each party to the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or her) own interest, so 
long as he avoids making misrepresentations.
9
 
As it was from the self-interested attitude that Leggatt J sought to depart,
10
 he seems, save in 
the cases of express stipulation of good faith, where perhaps his labours were not so 
imperatively required, to have laboured (so far at least) largely in vain. 
 I am of the opinion that no real progress will be made until this opposition of the 
attitudes towards contracting thought to be captured by good faith and self-interest is shown 
 
8
  Globe Motors, ibid [68], citing Marks and Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Security Services Trust Co Ltd  
[2015] UKSC 72, [2016] AC 742 at [26], [29]. Lord Neuberger’s statement itself quoted a dictum of Sir 
Thomas Bingham MR in Philips Electronique Grand Public SA v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [1995] 
EMLR 472 at 481. 
9
  Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128 at 138E (HL). 
10
  Walford v Miles was swiftly distinguished in Yam Seng on the ground that it concerned good faith in 
negotiation rather than, as in Yam Seng, good faith in performance: Yam Seng (n 1) [122]. See further n 88. 
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to be the false dichotomy it is. I have long believed that the English law in fact contains the 
doctrinal resources to do this,
11
 but I do not wish again to go over ground now so well 
covered by Leggatt J.
12
 I want, initially at least, to step away from the distinction between 
interpretation and implication, indeed from the law which Leggatt J sought to organise 
around good faith, and turn to the social philosophical roots of the understanding of self-
interest in the law of contract; which means, of course, turning to Adam Smith.
13
 
 In what may be the most influential passage in all of modern European social thought, 
Smith unforgettably wrote that: 
In civilised society [man] stands at all times in need of the co-operation and 
assistance of great multitudes [and] has almost constant occasion for the help of 
his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He 
will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour … and 
it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those 
good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the 
butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard 
to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-
love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.
14
 
What does this description of exchange in terms of self-interest mean for a law of contract 
which attempts to provide the legal framework for economic action? As it has been taken up 
in neo-classical economics and in the classical law of contract, Smith’s concept of self-
interest has been regarded as emptying exchange of other-regarding moral content, Lord 
Ackner’s views in Walford v Miles being a paradigmatic expression of this. 
 
11
  D Campbell, “The relational constitution of the discrete contract”, in D Campbell and P Vincent-Jones (eds), 
Contract and Economic Organisation (1996) 40. 
12
  In addition to certain doctrines mentioned in the paper I have just cited which should be added to Leggatt J’s 
list, much greater emphasis should be placed on implied terms as the principal constituents of all but very 
exceptional contracts: H Collins, “Implied terms: The foundation in good faith and fair dealing” (2014) 67 
CLP 297. 
13
  Any attempt to assess the importance of Smith for the law of contract is now, of course, indebted to PS 
Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979) at 294-304. However, the account of self-interest 
advanced here implicitly criticises Atiyah, who accepted the (to use a term to be developed later) solipsistic 
view of self-interest, exchange and laissez faire, and, stressing that view’s shortcomings, described the 
necessity of curtailing self-interest, a process in which welfarist legislation played a major role. It is argued 
here that the laissez faire view was not self-conscious of the other-regarding quality implicit in exchange 
motivated by self-interest, and the point is not to curtail self-interest but to make it, in Hegel’s terms, actual.  
14
  A Smith, The Wealth of Nations, in The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence, vol 2 (1976) at 
26-27. Here, as in discussion of Smith throughout, I treat his usage “self-love” as synonymous with “self-
interest”. When I have thought it helpful, I have silently brought Smith’s spelling and punctuation into 
conformity with modern usage. 
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 But I will argue that Lord Ackner did not grasp the essential, other-regarding dimension 
of Smith’s concept of economic self-interest, and therefore the essential, other-regarding 
moral content of the doctrine of agreement in the law of contract. Our understanding of Lord 
Ackner’s famous dictum, and indeed of Walford v Miles itself, is seriously undermined by our 
defective concept of self-interest. 
 
B. SMITH ON SELF-INTEREST AND THE FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT 
It is very arguable that Smith’s most important achievement was, with others of whom 
Mandeveille was the most important other than Smith himself, to give self-interest a central 
and, more importantly, a positive, role in modern moral and political philosophy and, as part 
of this, in what is now “economics”. As will be seen,15 it is ultimately impossible to separate 
Smith’s views of the exercise of self-interest specifically in the economic sphere from his 
views of its exercise generally, and adequate discussion of the relationship of the specific and 
the general would require Smith’s views of the overall range of human motivations to be 
taken into account. But, so far as it is possible, I shall avoid discussion of Smith’s general 
moral philosophy and will broaden out discussion of his understanding of the self-interest 
which motivates economic exchange only in so far as this is needed for the analysis of the 
exercise of self-interest through contract.  
 Smith regarded it as a very positive feature of self-interest as the motivation of 
economic exchange that it was quite distinct from a direct concern with the public interest. 
Smith believed the impulse to “bettering our condition” to be universal amongst 
humankind,
16
 but that the material and hence cultural improvement of modern European 
society arose from a particular means of betterment. In the “Age of Commerce”, the highest 
 
15
  See text accompanying n 79. 
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of the four stages of the development of European society,
17
 the general liberation of “a 
certain propensity in human nature … to … exchange one thing for another”18 had brought 
about the general division of labour which is the source of the historically unprecedented 
wealth of that Age.
19
 The division of labour, however, was “not originally the effect of any 
human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives 
occasion”.20 It rather was an unintended consequence of the degree of specialisation 
permitted by the generalisation of exchange. 
 It is impossible even to be remotely fully cognisant of, much less to supervise, the 
tantamount to infinite complexity of economic action under a developed division of labour.
21
 
Economic order in commercial society is established, not by a conscious attempt to establish 
that order, but as an emergent property of economic actors’ pursuit of their self-interest: 
Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most 
advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own 
advantage indeed, and not that of society which he has in view. But the study of 
his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to prefer that 
employment which is most advantageous to society … every individual 
necessarily labours to render the annual revenue as great as he can. He generally 
indeed neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is 
promoting it … he intends only his own gain and he is … led by an invisible hand 
to promote an end which was no part of his intention.
22
 
Smith himself saw the invisible hand, by the working of which “the obvious and simple 
system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord”,23 as the hand of Providence.24 
This is, of course, not acceptable to the preponderance of contemporary opinion, though 
rejection of Smith’s views does not mean that we therefore now have an adequate 
understanding of how the pursuit of self-interest leads, not to chaos, but to economic order. 
 
17
  A Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, in The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence, vol 5 
(1978) at 14. 
18
  Smith (n 14) 25. 
19
  Ibid 23-24. 
20
  Ibid 25. 
21
  Ibid 22-23. 
22
  Ibid 454, 456. 
23
  Ibid 687. 
24
  A Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, in The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence, vol 1 
(1976) at 236. 
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This presumably is why the invisible hand, a mere metaphor if divorced from Smith’s views, 
remains the principal way we describe the mechanism at work. We fortunately can here 
merely accept the existence of that mechanism and note only that Smith saw laissez faire as a 
necessary corollary of belief in the invisible hand: 
it requires no more than to leave [Nature] alone and give her fair play in the 
pursuit of her own ends that she may establish her own designs … Little else is 
required to carry a state to the highest degree of affluence … brought about by the 
natural course of things.
25
 
 It is implicit in the idea of laissez faire, and indeed it is the core of Smith’s views, that 
government cannot possibly generally direct economic action, and that any attempt to do so 
will have extremely unwelcome results even if it is well intended.
26
 Smith was also, however, 
extremely conscious that a government which, in its “folly and presumption”, aggregated to 
itself the power to purport to undertake such general direction, would be bound to be 
despotic
27
 and to invite corruption and waste.
28
 Nevertheless, it has long been incontestable 
within Smith scholarship that Smith’s commitment to laissez faire is limited in numerous 
important ways, two of which are of significance here. 
 First, Smith had a strong perception of some of what would now be called the social 
costs of capitalism, and in this he was a characteristic figure of the Scottish Enlightenment, 
which regarded certain alienating effects of commercial society on its working class with 
great concern.
29
 Smith clearly anticipated what would now be called the positive externality 
argument for the provision of public goods in order to alleviate social costs when he 
identified “the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and public institutions” 
 
25
  D Stewart, “Account of the life and writings of Adam Smith LLD”, in A Smith, Essays on Philosophical 
Subjects, in The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence, vol 3 (1980) 263 at 322. 
26
  Smith (n 14) 687. That The Wealth of Nations is a polemic against Mercantilist policies which Smith 
believed to be profoundly mistaken is a subsidiary aspect of this general point. No policy of general 
direction could possibly be correct. 
27
  Ibid 456. 
28
  Ibid 356. 
29
  Smith (n 14) 781-782. 
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as the third of the three proper functions of government.
30
 Whilst his view of the legitimate 
range of public services was highly restricted by comparison to the predominant 
contemporary one,
31
 he saw it as one of the two tasks of political economy to advise “the 
state or commonwealth [how to obtain] a revenue sufficient for [such] services”.32 In sum, 




 of those who claimed to 
act directly in the public interest, Smith certainly allowed of the necessity of what would now 
be called intervention. 
 Secondly, it is equally incontestable in Smith scholarship that Smith did not conceive of 
the economic pursuit of self-interest in an, as it were, untrammelled way. When Smith speaks 
of self-interest, it is of self-interest bounded within a system of what he called “justice”. In 
some of the quotations from famous texts I have already given, I have omitted important 
sentences or clauses which significantly shift what he meant by self-interest and laissez faire. 
When, for example, Smith claimed that “Little else is required to carry a state to the highest 
degree of affluence” in addition to giving Nature “her fair play in the pursuit of her own 
ends”, in an omitted clause he specified that the “Little else” was the not inconsiderable task 
of maintaining “peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice”.35 And the effect 
of leaving the invisible hand to establish the system of natural liberty was that: 
Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free 
to pursue his own interest in his own way.
36
 
 Economic self-interest is not untrammelled self-interest. It is self-interest pursued 
consistently with justice. The exercise of self-interest in pursuit of economic goods can, of 
 
30
  Ibid 687-688. 
31
  Ibid 723. Smith was by no means so inflexible as to fail to allow even the most blatant peacetime “sacrifice 
[of] the ordinary laws of justice to an idea of public utility” were it justified by “the most urgent necessity”: 
ibid 539.  
32
  Ibid 428. 
33
  Ibid 687. 
34
  Ibid 456. 
35
  Stewart (n 25) 322. 
36
  Smith (n 14) 687 (emphasis added). 
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course, take the form of mere appropriation, especially, Smith believed, in commercial 
society, where the very accumulation of property provides a degree of incentive to mere 
appropriation not found in rude societies.
37
 He therefore argued that, after ensuring a political 
society’s protection “from the violence and invasion of other independent societies” and so 
securing the “external peace” essential to the society’s very existence,38 “the duty of 
establishing an exact administration of justice” was the second proper function of 
government,
39
 coming before what we have seen was the third, “erecting and maintaining 
certain public works and public institutions”. Self-interest is the driving force of 
improvement – “The uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his 
condition” – only because, when exercised consistently with justice, it takes the beneficent 
form of exchange, and so becomes “the principle from which public and national, as well as 
private, opulence is originally derived”.40 In sum, Smith saw that what I will call regulation is 
necessary for a market to exist because it is necessary to channel self-interest and ultimately 
that channelling must be enforced by the monopoly of violence.
41
 
 I believe it is helpful to use a wide definition of regulation, derived from the late 
Ronald Coase, as the establishment and maintenance of a legal framework within which 
legitimate economic activity may be carried out”,42 and to adopt Coase’s corollary 
recognition that “The term ‘regulation’ … is often confined to the work of the [executive], 
but regulation is also the result of legislative and judicial actions, and it seems ill-advised not 
to take these into consideration”. On this definition of regulation, intervention may itself be 
defined as a specific form of regulation which, unlike the general regulation which makes 
choice in a market possible, attempts to alter market outcomes. On these definitions, Smith 
 
37
  Ibid 709-710. 
38
  Ibid 689. 
39
  Ibid 687. 
40
  Ibid 343. 
41
  Ibid 710. 
42
  R H Coase, “Advertising and Free Speech” (1977) 6 JLS 1 at 5. 
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allowed intervention a subsidiary (and very minor by contemporary standards) role in the 
economy of commercial society, but recognised that non-interventionist, framework setting 
regulation is indispensable to the very existence of that economy. The issue is not whether 
Smith thought regulation indispensable but how extensive he saw the regulation necessary to 
fulfil its indispensable role.  
 Smith’s thought on this issue has the following implication for our understanding of the 
role of the law of contract in economic regulation. What specifically does the tolerable 
administration of justice entail? In commercial society, exchange begins with economic 
actors in private ownership of initial endowments of resources. The seller has the resources 
(which constitute the capacity) to deliver goods. The buyer has the resources (which 
constitute the capacity) to make payment. Exchange is possible, then, only if economic actors 
initially acknowledge each other’s private property, and so: 
The first and chief design of every system of government is to maintain justice; to 
prevent the members of a society from encroaching on one another’s property, or 
seizing what is not their own. The design here is to give each one the secure and 




 Having established private property in goods by regulation, we must now turn to the 
establishment and promotion of exchange of those goods. It is not going too far to claim that, 
obviously initially most surprisingly, Smith says almost nothing about this. The concept by 
which he addresses the issues is that of “police”. Having secured ownership: 
the government will next be desirous of promoting the opulence of the state. This 
produces what we will call police. Whatever regulations are made with respect to 
the trade, commerce, agriculture, manufactures of the country are considered as 
belonging to the police.
44
  
 It is entirely possible that, understood with this purpose, Smith’s concept of police 
could have embraced extensive regulation in the sense I have defined the term, as indeed 
 
43
  Smith (n 17) 5. 
44
  Smith (n 17) 5. 
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could Smith’s concept of the tolerable administration of justice, which he was apt to describe 
as the sovereign’s duty “of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from 
the injustice or oppression of every other member of it”,45 and which he believed inevitably 
would require an expansion of laws in proportion to the improvement of a society.
46
 But, 
though it is right to say that The Wealth of Nations was pre-eminently concerned with the 
promotion of the opulence of commercial society,
47
 and though this meant increasing the 
volume of exchange,
48
 Smith certainly did not view police in this expansive manner. Insisting 
in his conception of general jurisprudence upon a strict separation of justice and police,
49
 he 
saw the latter as a “mean” or “trifling” subject embracing the “inferior parts of government”, 
one which, police being a strange term to the contemporary reader, would perhaps now be 
better rendered as “(public) management”. Being based on the shifting grounds of 
“expediency” rather than stable principles of “justice”,50 police did not really have to be 
considered in light of the great principles of government as did the maintenance of external 
and internal peace.
51
 In this concept of police, to speak of regulation was to speak of, as it 
were, ad hoc sets of rules for particular activities intended to promote the growth of opulence, 
but which are incidental to the core of economic action, which is exchange. 
 In sum, whilst Smith acknowledges the necessity of regulation to establish private 
property, he does not similarly recognise the necessity of regulation to establish exchange. 
His concepts of justice and of police avoid addressing the issue, though a theory of the 
market economy must establish the legitimacy of both initial endowments and of the transfer 
of goods in order to demonstrate that ownership actually rests on, as Nozick put it, 
 
45
  Smith (n 14) 687, 708. 
46
  Smith (n 17) 16. 
47
  Smith (n 14) 428. 
48
  Ibid 31. 
49
  Smith (n 24) 3, 341-342. 
50
  Stewart (n 25) 275. 
51





 Of course, this avoidance might be said to follow inevitably from Smith’s 
intention to establish the general case for laissez faire. The regulations of police and the 
provision of public works had their place, but the most important thing was to keep 
government out of the basic economic process of exchange, for there self-interest, the 
propensity to exchange and the invisible hand would produce the best results, but they could 
do so only if left alone by government. 
 I have argued in much previous work that this “deregulatory” view is misleading. The 
particular error that it has led to in the interpretation of Smith that is of interest here is about 
the nature of self-interest when pursued through exchange. We will see that Smith’s concept 
of self-interested exchange is an intimately moral, other-regarding one which calls for, but 
does not adequately receive from Smith himself, consideration of the necessary and 
necessarily extensive channelling of self-interest into the form of exchange by regulation in 
the sense I have given the term, albeit that that regulation principally takes the private form of 
the law of contract. Paradoxically, to grasp this requires us to turn to one who, whilst his 
profound admiration for Smith was based on very considerable Smith scholarship, put 
forward what was intended to be the most radical criticism of him: Karl Marx. 
 
C. SMITH ON SELF-INTEREST AND EXCHANGE 
Though they may be deficient in the way I claim, Smith’s various comments on exchange 
yield one of the most important answers yet given to the question why the pursuit of self-
interest through exchange is generally beneficent. I have noted that self-interest as mere 
appropriation is untrammelled, but perhaps the better way to put it is that it is solipsistic. 
“Exchanges” that are made because one actor has, say, violently exercised duress over 
 
52
  R Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974) at 150-151.  
 13 
 
another show so complete a focus on the actor’s own interest as to completely disregard the 
other’s interest. 
 If language of this grandiloquence may be excused, it has been a matter of economic 
theory of significance for the entire history of the modern world that the only account of the 
social process of exchange that fundamentally adds to Smith is, paradoxically, that of the 
social theorist whose case for the complete abolition of the market economy has most merited 
serious consideration. In Capital volume 1, Marx described the process of exchange as 
follows. The owners of goods: 
must behave in such a way that each does not appropriate the [goods] of the other, 
and part with his own, except by means of an act done by mutual consent. They 
must, therefore, mutually recognise in each other the rights of private proprietors. 
This juridical relation, which thus expresses itself in a contract … is a relation 
between two wills and is but the reflex of the real economic relation of the two. It 




Three vital features of exchange emerge from this description of it, two of which Smith 
clearly embraced, but the third of which, though it is integral to Smith’s thinking, Smith 
himself did not adequately articulate, and Marx’s description of exchange is essential to 
grasping this third feature. 
 The first feature Marx describes (the second as he presents them) is that economic 
actors must recognise “the rights of private proprietors”. The second feature (the first as he 
presents them) is that the transfer of goods must be “by means of an act done by mutual 
consent”. We have seen that Smith was fully aware of the necessity of regulating to establish 
justice in order for private property to exist. But what did he say of how we guarantee transfer 
by mutual consent? 
 
53
  K Marx, Capital volume 1, in K Marx and F Engels, Collected Works, vol 35 (1996) at 95. I have replaced 
Marx’s use of “commodities” with “goods” which I trust will more clearly convey his meaning to the 
readership of this journal. 
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 We have examined one example of a famous description by Smith of the workings of 
commercial society taking on a somewhat different aspect if the usual quotation of that 
description is expanded. Leaving nature alone in order to give her her fair play involved, it 
emerged, establishing a system of justice.
54
 A very similar thing happens with other 
quotations from Smith in which he describes exchange. We have seen him claim that, 
standing in need of the co-operation and assistance of great multitudes, an economic actor 
will best obtain this by appealing to the multitudes’ self-interest.55 But how does this appeal 
precisely take place? The passage which begins “He will be more likely to prevail if he can 
interest their self-love in his favour” is in full: 
He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour and 
show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of 
them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind proposes to do this. Give 
me that which I want and you shall have this which you want is the meaning of 
every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far 
greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of.
56
 
 The significance of the now included and emphasised clauses is that it shows the 
economic actor indeed entering into an exchange to pursue his own self-interest – “give me 
that which I want” – but he can pursue his own self-interest only by obtaining the consent of 
the other actor to transfer that which is wanted by giving the other actor what he wants – “you 
shall have this which you want”. The first actor must secure the other actor’s consent to 
exchange by, as Smith put it in the Lectures on Jurisprudence, “setting before him a 
sufficient temptation” to transfer the goods wanted.57 To adopt the term used in the Lectures 
on Jurisprudence, exchange is based on persuasion: 
If we should enquire into the principle in the human mind on which the 
[propensity to exchange] is founded, it is clearly the natural inclination everyone 
has to persuade. The offering of a shilling, which to us appears to have so plain 
 
54
  See text accompanying n 25. 
55
  See text accompanying n 14. 
56
  Smith (n 14) 26 (emphasis added). 
57
  Smith (n 17) 493. 
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and simple a meaning, is in reality offering an argument to persuade one to do so 
and so as it is for his interest.
58
 
 In its ideal typical form, exchange is not altruistic.
59
 Neither actor directly wishes to 
promote the well-being of the other but only to pursue his own self-interest. But, as with the 
initial recognition of private property, the process of transfer is not based on solipsistic self-
interest. It is analytically based on a recognition of the self-interest of the other, and the 
economic actor accepts, not merely that pursuit of his own self-interest must allow the other 
actor to pursue his own self-interest, but that the first actor can pursue his own self-interest 
only by being the means by which the other pursues his. Self-interest in exchange is, Marx 
tells us when identifying the third vital feature of exchange, a form of “mutual recognition”. 
Though there is no direct textual warrant for this, Marx undoubtedly derived his description 
of exchange from GWF Hegel’s various comments on contract, which make the necessity of 
consensual exchange,
60
 and mutual recognition as the means of obtaining consent,
61
 essential 
features of contract. The concept of mutual recognition is at the heart of Hegel’s entire 
contribution to moral and political philosophy,
62
 and has most important dimensions which 
cannot be considered here. It is necessary only to emphasise that exchange is based on self-
interest, and shares this with mere appropriation, but that, whereas mere appropriation is a 
solipsistic exercise of self-interest,
63
 this is the last thing that can be said of exchange, which 
has the moral, other-regarding component of mutual recognition as its analytically essential 
feature, ie the feature that distinguishes exchange from solipsistic forms of the pursuit of self-
 
58
  Ibid 352. 
59
  Smith would have referred to “benevolence” rather than “altruism”, and gave a very restricted, if very 
important, role to benevolence amongst human motivations, believing self-interest to be far more important: 
Smith (n 24) 85-86.  
60
  G W F Hegel, Philosophy of Mind (1971) at sec 492.  
61
  G W F Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1991) at sec 71. 
62
  G W F Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (1976) at 118-119. 
63
  And so fraud, as opposed to breach of contract, is a crime: Smith (n 17) 105. 
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interest such as duress. Self-interested exchange that is fully self-conscious of its own nature, 
or “actual” as Hegel would have put it,64 rejects solipsism. 
 Criticisms may be made of the limited nature of Smith’s conception of the work of 
government necessary to establish justice. But his conception of what is needed to establish 
mutual consent in transfer by exchange is much more limited, reflecting the nature of his 
concept of police. Like almost all subsequent advocacy of laissez faire, Smith’s concepts of 
justice and police work as a metaphor of erecting a minimalist framework – “restricted”, as 
JS Mill put it, to “protection … against force or fraud’65 - and standing back. But even 
regulation which intends, not to intervene, but to facilitate allocation by choice cannot be 
passive in this way. If we reflect on the topics Smith saw as covered by police – “the trade, 
commerce, agriculture [and] manufactures of the country” – it can be seen that adequate 
regulation covering these topics should not be conceived of passively but should be seen to 
require, not only the in itself demanding task of initially positing the law, but also then 
monitoring and adjusting it in light of moves made by economic actors in response to the 
posited law; a continuous and active, reflexive process which Matthias Klaes and I have 
called “institutional direction”.66  
 The extent to which the government of Smith’s day could be involved in the active 
promotion of police is, of course, very different from what would be expected now, and even 
those like myself who believe that contemporary government very frequently indeed exceeds 
the bounds of its competence should not, I submit, deny that that expectation is essentially 
justified, which denial would be a mere affectation. But the point is that the passive 
conception of regulation which leads to laissez faire is wrong in principle. In his excellent 
review of the subject, Fine defined laissez faire as “the arguments of those who [accept] 
 
64
  Hegel (n 61) 19-21 and G W F Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic (1991) at sec 6. 
65
  J S Mill, Principles of Political Economy, in Collected Works, vols 2-3 (1965) at 936. 
66
  D Campbell and M Klaes, “The principle of institutional direction: Coase’s regulatory critique of 
intervention” (2005) 29 Camb J Econ 263 at 277-280. 
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government as a necessity but [nevertheless wish] to see its functions reduced to the 
narrowest possible limits”.67 But the accuracy of Fine’s definition in part follows from its 
leaving the way of determining the “narrowest possible limits” unspecified. In this vacuum, 
“narrowness” becomes associated with passivity and minimalism. This cannot be right. The 
narrowest optimal limits are set at the points where regulation intended to promote private 
opulence through exchange actually ceases to promote it; which, to put the point the other 
way around, means that regulation more minimal than this is not optimally sufficient. 
 Smith was nothing if not the most pragmatic of philosophers, and scattered throughout 
the Lectures on Jurisprudence and The Wealth of Nations are approving comments on or 
suggestions for legal and other actions for the facilitation of beneficent exchange. These 
actions cannot easily be regarded as interventions in the market but should be seen as 





 of goods when there are valid reasons to doubt private guarantees, statutory setting 
of rates of interest to limit usury
70
 and excessively speculative investment,
71
 statutory limits 
on the issue of banknotes to prevent excessive concentration of bank capital,
72
 and the 
statutory prohibition of truck on the ground that truck typically allowed effective short 
payment by the employer.
73
 In particular, Smith insisted that the superior reliability in 
commercial society of the enforcement of contracts by the courts, which of course depends 
on government expenditure, was an essential advantage of that society over rude societies.
74
 
This is a paradigm of the role of regulation as I am using the term. 
 
67
  S Fine, Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare State (1956) at vii. 
68
  Smith (n 14) 138-139. 
69
  Smith (n 17) 372. 
70
  Smith (n 14) 356. 
71
  Ibid 357.  
72
  Ibid, 329. 
73
  Smith (n 14) 158. 
74
  Ibid 112. 
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 The point is that Smith was inadequately conscious of the extent of the regulation 
necessary, not to intervene in the market, but to create the general market economy in which 
one might occasionally intervene. As a result, the fundamental impression left on the 
contemporary reader’s mind by The Wealth of Nations is of a wonderful optimism which it is 
hard now to share to anything like the same degree. The shortcomings of the system of 
natural liberty which have since led to regulation and intervention at the scale and scope now 
considered normal are very largely recognised by Smith, but not thought sufficiently serious, 
given the power of the system of natural liberty, to warrant active and extensive government 
action. He would be aghast at the extent of government action which now claims justification 
on this basis. Interpretations of Smith which take the things he undoubtedly said in favour of 
regulation and intervention to claim him for the modern welfare economics of widespread 
intervention are badly mistaken; indeed they are merely the equally exaggerated obverse of 
extreme liberal attempts similarly to claim him for a literal laissez faire. But I submit it would 
be entirely correct to say that he saw government action to ensure justice and police as 
essential to the opulence of commercial society and that the narrowness of his conception 
especially of police is inconsistent with his own views and with what it is now right to 
recognise is actually involved in regulating for, not intervening in, a market economy. In 
principle, Smith could and should have given regulation facilitating markets a greater scale 
and scope. Any proposed regulation would, however, have to be defended on its merits after 
it has been acknowledged, in no small part due to Smith, that regulation which, even if not 
intended to do so, hinders rather than facilitates exchange, runs counter to the public interest 




D. SMITH ON SELF-INTEREST AND THE LAW OF CONTRACT 
Smith’s failure to appreciate the extent of regulation which his own argument shows to be 
optimal is even more clear in regard of the law of contract than it is with regard to 
government action. This was inevitable as the wide concept of regulation I am using in one 
sense simply overrides the strong distinction between government (ie executive and 
legislature) and the courts, and the confidence that the courts were strictly confined to 
adjudication,
75
 which were central to Smith’s views on the constitutional law and politics of 
liberty.
76
 Smith could not be expected to systematically bring private law under his concept 
of police. I believe I am justified in doing just this because it is essential to include the private 
law in any comprehensive account of the regulation of economic action, and because it is 
possible to do so without reducing the private law to merely a means of implementing 
government intervention. Though Smith’s account of the law of contract is brief and in fact 
somewhat derivative, it makes, as one of course expects, points of value, and in particular 
contains a reliance theory of liability that has continuing interest. But Smith had no great 
familiarity with the law, and there is little or nothing of value in his work explicitly on the 
law of contract about how economic exchanges are actually made. But once one appreciates 
the active aspect of regulation for facilitation of the market economy, then the extremely 
important implication for the law of contract of understanding that exchange is based on 
mutual recognition may be made clear. 
 There is a striking footnote provided by a Victorian editor of The Wealth of Nations that 
expresses this implication of Smith’s views so well that even so acute a commentator as the 
late Professor Stein mistakenly thought that Smith himself was responsible for that 
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  Smith (n 17) 275. 
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 In 1869, the Clarendon Press brought out an edition under the editorship of JE 
Thorold Rogers, the distinguished economic historian and liberal political economist. To the 
famous sentence which we have seen runs in full “He will be more likely to prevail if he can 
interest their self-love in his favour and show them that it is for their own advantage to do for 
him what he requires of them”, Thorold Rogers provided the following footnote: 
In all voluntary contracts, both parties gain. For a long time, however, people 
were possessed of the idea that one man’s gain is another man’s loss. 
Unfortunately, legislation proceeded on this fallacy, and consequently busied 
itself with restrictions, prohibitions, compensation and the like.
78
 
 By no means novel at its time, this footnote anticipated the formalisation of what now 
stands as “the first theorem” of welfare economics: Pareto optimality. The principal value of 
Pareto optimality is that it captures the way that the legitimacy of the market economy does 
not inhere in the substantive production of a set of collectively valued goods but in the pure 
procedure of whatever goods are produced being produced because of the choices of 
individual economic actors. Pareto optimality states that an economy is in an equilibrium 
constituting optimum welfare when all exchanges of goods between economic actors have 
taken place, this being identified by the impossibility of a reallocation of goods that would 
not leave at least one actor worse off.  
 There surely can be few if any statements in social thought which seem so dry and yet 
are more densely packed with social content than Pareto optimality. In the ideal typical 
market economy, goods are allocated by the free choices of economic actors expressed in 
voluntary economic exchanges institutionalised as contractual agreements. Economic actors 
are motivated by self-interest, but voluntary exchange agreements can take place only when 
both parties perceive an advantage to be gained. It is, not the pursuit of self-interest, but the 
possibility of its pursuit through mutually advantageous exchanges that makes the market 
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  P Stein, “The General Notions of Contract and Property in Eighteenth Century Scottish Thought” [1963] Jur 
Rev 1 at 11. 
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economy possible. When all exchange possibilities have been exhausted in a therefore 
automatically established Pareto optimal equilibrium, further reallocation of goods cannot 
take place save by, say, a “contract” which is not actually an agreement, or a transfer by 
government ultimately dependent on the monopoly of violence, for this reallocation must be 
to at least one actor’s disadvantage as the actor defines it. If it were not to the actor’s 
disadvantage, there would be no need to induce it by contractual force or fraud or compel it 
by government. It would automatically follow from actors’ pursuit of their self-interest. The 
beautiful symmetry of the model lies in its being driven by voluntary exchange motivated by 
subjectively defined self-interest, and working only because it is so driven. 
 The point implicit in Smith that is brought out by Thorold Rogers is that it is wrong to 
see the legitimacy of the market economy as essentially resting on the liberation of the 
propensity to exchange if exchange is not viewed socially. Behind the neo-classical 
economics which understand freedom of choice as a matter of the economic actor “revealing” 
his preferences, and behind the classical law of contract which understands freedom of 
contract as a matter of the contracting party giving effect to his subjective will, stands the 
value of the autonomy of the economic actor or contracting party. The legitimacy of the 
market economy does, indeed, ultimately rest on autonomy, but seen as a matter of 
preference revelation or subjective will, autonomy is focused on the individual and abstracts 
from the social processes of economic exchange and contractual agreement which constitute 
the market economy. However, individual autonomy is possible only because of mutual 
advantage. The economic actor could not reveal his preferences if those preferences could not 
form the basis of an exchange. The contracting party could not act on his subjective will if 
that will could not form the basis of a voluntary agreement giving effect to objective 
intentions. What is essential to the processes of exchange and contract is not solipsistic self-
interest but self-interest which is other-regarding; self-interest based on mutual recognition. 
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 The implication of thoughts of this nature for Smith’s own view of self-interest is, I 
believe, undeniable if unclear. We have seen that when Smith discusses the process of 
exchange in itself rather than the urge to betterment which begins the process, the essential 
feature of that process is shown to be, not the solipsistic pursuit of self-interest, but 
persuasion. These passages are brief or very brief. But they should be read in the context of 
Smith’s much more sustained examination of the bounds of the legitimate exercise of self-
interest generally, ie in economic and other contexts, the principal theme of which is that the 
untrammelled exercise of self-interest is immoral, and will be felt to be so by the human 
being of good will: 
There is no commonly honest man … who does not inwardly feel the truth of the 
great Stoical maxim that for one man to deprive another unjustly of anything, or 
unjustly to promote his advantage by the loss of another, is more contrary to 
nature than death, than poverty, than pain, than all the misfortunes which can 
affect him either in his body or in his external circumstances.
79
 
 This sets rules, to put it this way, for the legitimate pursuit of self-interest, rules that 
may allow the acquisition of goods from another, but not their unjust deprivation; and may 
allow the promotion of individual advantage, but not by unjustly causing another loss. Such 
rules certainly cover the initial ownership of goods, but they would be pointless unless they 
included rules about the process of transfer, for, of course, the value of initial ownership will 
be reduced or nullified by defects in that process. Smith accordingly tells us that “In the race 
for wealth and honours and preferments”, one who is legitimately self-interested must: 
humble the arrogance of his self-love, and bring it down to something which 
other men can go along with. They will indulge it so far as to allow him to be 
more anxious about, and to pursue with more earnest assiduity, his own happiness 
rather than that of any other person … In the race for wealth and honours and 
preferments, he may run as hard as he can, and strain every nerve and muscle, in 
order to outstrip all his competitors. But if he should justle, or throw down any of 
them, the indulgence of the spectators is entirely at an end. It is a violation of fair 
 
79
  Smith (n 24) at 138. Smith was profoundly influenced by Stoicism and this maxim undoubtedly is taken, 
indeed taken almost verbatim, from De Officiis, iii, 21: Cicero, On Duties (1991) at 108. I am indebted to G 
Vivenza, Adam Smith and the Classics (2001) at 2 for the identification of this source. 
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play, which they cannot admit of … they do not enter into that self-love by which 
he prefers himself so much to this other.
80
 
 Though Smith’s views on contract are very limited in range for the reasons I have tried 
to explain, he would not have conceived of the process of contractual agreement as an 
exercise of solipsistic self-interest. His views on the limits to self-interest necessary for 
justice are well-developed and relatively clear. His much less well-developed and, in part 
therefore, much less clear views on the centrality of persuasion to exchange, situated in a 
generally other-regarding view of the legitimate pursuit of self-interest, would have led him 
to conceive of contractual agreement in the spirit of mutual recognition, and the concrete 
form such a law would take would, in fact, be somewhat like the English law described by 
Leggatt J. It is not that the common law of contract is not essentially other-regarding; it is that 
we are not self-conscious of what the wisdom of the common law has brought about. In order 





E. GOOD FAITH IN WALFORD v MILES 
In Walford v Miles, the defendants wished to sell their photographic processing company, 
PNM Laboratories Ltd. On their own behalf, the defendants’ longstanding accountants, who 
previously had tried to buy the business, made an offer of £1.9 million. The claimants made 
an offer of £2 million which was accepted subject to contract. The defendants immediately 
told their accountants of this development, and continued negotiations with them which led to 
the accountants increasing their own offer to £2 million and the defendants accepting this 
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  Smith (n 24) 83. 
81
  I believe that the analysis I am about to put forward of the particular issue in Walford v Miles could be traced 
back to Hillas and Co Ltd v Arcos Co Ltd (1932) 43 Ll L Rep 359 and May and Butcher Ltd v R [1934] 2 
KB 17n , and from this to the treatment of “selfishness” in numerous important cases of the period. 
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offer. The claimants regarded this as a breach of contract.
82
 The claimants did not dispute that 
the conveyance itself was subject to contract, and the breach they alleged was not of this 
agreement but of a collateral contract which stipulated certain conditions under which 
negotiation of the main contract was to have been conducted. 
 It was clear at the outset that these negotiations would take some time, not least because 
the defendants sought an assurance of the claimants’ ability to pay the price offered, and a 
comfort letter was obtained from the claimants’ bankers. But, aware of the defendants’ 
relationship with their accountants, the claimants were extremely insistent that they would 
provide this letter, and otherwise commit themselves to the negotiations, only if the 
defendants agreed to negotiate with them exclusively.
83
 It was not disputed that the relevant 
terms under which the comfort letter was provided were set out in a letter from the claimants 
to the defendants’ solicitor: 
[the defendants] agreed that if [the comfort] letter were in [their] hands by close 
of business on Friday of this week [they] would terminate negotiations with any 
third party or consideration of any alternative with a view to concluding 
agreements with [the claimants,] and [they] further agreed that even if [they] 
received a satisfactory proposal from any third party before close of business on 
Friday night [they] would not deal with that third party and nor would [they] give 
further consideration to any alternative.
84
 
The alleged breach was of this contract which purported to “lock out” other potential buyers 
of PNM, including, of course, the accountants who did eventually buy it. 
 Without fully going into the commercial background which certainly can justify the use 
of a lock-out agreement in appropriate circumstances, it is necessary here only to say that it 
was not really argued that a potential offeror cannot in principle protect the expenditure it 
must make in drawing up its offer by seeking a period of exclusivity in negotiations, and this 
 
82
  For reasons of space, a claim for misrepresentation, though of significance, will not be discussed. This claim 
was not the occasion of the reference to misrepresentation in Lord Ackner’s famous dictum.  
83
  Walford v Miles [1990] 1 EGLR 212 at 214D-E (QB). 
84
  Walford v Miles (HL) (n 9) 133E. 
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was allowed by Lord Ackner.
85
 Confirming the Court of Appeal’s reversal of the trial judge’s 
verdict for the claimants, Lord Ackner found, however, that the particular lock-out agreement 
relied on by the claimants was an agreement to agree and as such unenforceable in English 
law for want of certainty. Lord Ackner believed the law about agreements to agree to have 
been settled over 15 years previously in Courtney and Fairbairn v Tolaini, and he 
approvingly cited the reasoning there of Lord Denning MR: 
If the law does not recognise a contract to enter into a contract (when there is a 
fundamental term yet to be agreed) it seems to me it cannot recognise a contract 
to negotiate. The reason is because it is too uncertain to have any binding force … 
It seems to me that a contract to negotiate, like a contract to enter into a contract, 
is not a contract known to the law … I think we must apply the general principle 
that where there is a fundamental matter left undecided and to be the subject of 
negotiation, there is no contract.
86
 
 In Courtney and Fairbairn v Tolaini, negotiations had been started about the 
development of a building site, but the term which remained to be agreed, about which it was 
argued there was an agreement to agree, was in essence the price of extensive works to be 
undertaken. Though the case does, in fact, give rise to some concern,
87
 it is submitted that it 
is correct to refuse to enforce an agreement of this nature in circumstances akin to those of 
Courtney and Fairbairn v Tolaini.
88
 But the fundamental reason this is so is, not a want of 
certainty, but that the voluntary, persuasive nature of the main agreement which would likely 
be reached (the works contract in Courtney and Fairbairn v Tolaini, the sale of PNM in 
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  Walford v Miles (HL) (n 9) 139D-E. 
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  Courtney and Fairbairn Ltd v Tolaini Brothers (Hotels) Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 297 at 301-302, cited in Walford 
v Miles (HL) (n 9) 136H-137A. 
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  The decision in the case allowed the defendant to benefit from work the claimant did in arranging finance for 
the works without the claimant deriving any of the benefit of the consideration of carrying out the works 
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88
  As we shall see, the nature of the main contract is crucial context for deciding upon the enforceability of the 
collateral contract, and in particular the pricing of complex works, conveyances and the like must be 
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reasonable inquiry, which, of course, are dealt with under The Sales of Goods Act 1979 s 8(2). Even more 
significant is the distinction between possible gap-filling in agreements and gap-filling in performance after, 
ex hypothesi, agreement has been reached. Lord Ackner was anxious to draw this distinction when 
commenting on the idea of “best endeavours” (Walford v Miles (HL) (n 9) 138B-C) and from, as it were, the 
opposite perspective, so was Leggatt J in Yam Seng (n 1) [122], Yam Seng being akin to a best endeavours 
case. For reasons of space, I shall not pursue this issue. 
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Walford v Miles) would certainly be undermined were the collateral contract enforceable. 
Discussion of the agreement to agree is in general undermined by confusion over the concept 
of the want of certainty. It is not that performance of the principal obligations under any main 
contract would need an undesirable or indeed impossible level of court supervision in order to 
be performed.
89
 It is that, were an agreement to agree enforced then, fearing a substantial 
damages award reflecting lost expectation on the main contract,
90
 the defendant would be 
effectively obliged to reach an agreement (or pay for release), and such constraints obliging 
the defendant to agree would unacceptably undermine the persuasive, voluntary nature of that 
agreement. I repeat that, whilst it is entirely conceivable that a party would agree to conduct 
its negotiations under certain restrictions of its freedom to contract (such as an exclusivity 
agreement), it is not reasonably conceivable that a party would objectively intend to curtail its 
capacity to choose in this drastic way. 
 As much commentary has indicated, Walford v Miles can readily be distinguished from 
Courtney and Fairbairn v Tolaini. A lock-out agreement qua lock-out agreement is not an 
agreement to agree. It rather obliges the defendant to negotiate exclusively with the claimant 
for the agreement’s duration. As we have seen, Lord Ackner himself allowed such 
agreements in principle. The issue is why the lock-out agreement in Walford v Miles was 
viewed differently. 
 Lord Ackner regarded it as very important that this particular lock-out agreement did 
not specify its duration.
91
 It may have been wiser for the claimants to have specified a date by 
 
89
  There could be no question of specific performance and I am unaware of any authority in relevant 
circumstances leading to, as it were, indirect specific performance by means of prohibitory injunction. 
90
  The judgment at first instance in Walford v Miles (QB) (n 83) 214E-F would lead one to think such an award 
would have been made but the parties had agreed that quantum would  be determined by a higher court. The 
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space I will not examine this difficult question as it arose in the law applicable to Walford v Miles but, in 
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for breach of the collateral contract. Limitations on any award of expectation damages might arise from 
reasons of want of certainty which are not specific to an exclusivity agreement. 
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 Walford v Miles (HL) (n 9) 136D-E. 
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which agreement should have been reached, and after Walford v Miles one would be inclined 
to take this into account when giving advice.
92
 But in the case itself it is hard to maintain this 
position for one can readily see why the parties instead saw the matter as one of the 
agreement lasting for a “reasonable time”,93 which, by avoiding a specific date, or by being 
usefully relaxed about any such date,
94
 would itself have minimised one source of pressure to 
agree. In the Court of Appeal, Bingham LJ, dissenting, had little problem implying the 
necessary term,
95
 and it is not necessary to go into the considerable authority which may be 
marshalled in justification of his doing so because it is, I believe, generally agreed that, had 
the lock-out agreement been seen only as a negative exclusivity agreement rather than a 
positive agreement to agree, it would have been enforceable, and the defendants’ breach of it, 
though it was the principal issue of fact to be decided at first instance,
96
 should then have 
been unarguable. 
 It was very largely some unwisely over-ambitious pleading by the claimants in 
response to the perceived difficulty of the agreement’s having no specific duration that led 
Lord Ackner to formulate the dictum which has led to Walford v Miles becoming so 
influential.
97
 The lock-out agreement detailed in the claimants’ letter quoted above98 was 
made the basis of the statement of claim, but that statement was amended so that the 
following was added: 
It was a term of the [lock-out] agreement necessarily to be implied to give 
business efficacy thereto that, so long as they continued to desire to sell the said 
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The purpose of this was to show that the negotiations could not, in the absence of a date for 
their conclusion, go on forever, but this particular way of doing this purports to transform the 
negative agreement not to negotiate with others into a positive agreement to agree with the 
claimant if PNM was to be sold at all, and as such it was rightly rejected by Lord Ackner.
100
 
Lord Ackner claimed that there was a want of certainty because the main contract was still 
subject to contract and so literally had not been agreed,
101
 but an air of casuistry about this 
arises from its being an indirect way of referring to the real mischief, which is that enforcing 
this specific collateral contract as it emerged from the claimants’ pleadings would tend to 
push the defendants into the main agreement in an unacceptable way. The vital clause was 
not “negotiate in good faith” but “so long as they continued to desire to sell”. 
 If this was not enough, when further pressed on the, as it were, variant point of how the 
defendants were to end the negotiations if an agreement to sell was not concluded, the 
defendant suggested that “a term was to be implied giving the [defendants] a right to 
determine the negotiations, but only if they had ‘a proper reason’”.102 Lord Ackner was 
unprepared to countenance the burden he saw this imposing on the courts of deciding whether 
or not any reason given was proper,
103
 and this was the precise occasion for his famous 
comments on good faith: 
uncertainty is demonstrated in the instant case by the provision which it is said 
has to be implied in the agreement for the determination of the negotiations. How 
can a court be expected to decide whether … a proper reason existed for the 
termination of negotiations? The answer suggested depends upon whether the 
negotiations have been determined “in good faith”. However the concept of a 
duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently repugnant to the 
adversarial position of the parties when involved in negotiations. Each party to 
the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or her) own interest, so long as he avoids 
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making misrepresentations. To advance that interest he must be entitled, if he 
thinks it appropriate, to threaten to withdraw from further negotiations or to 
withdraw in fact, in the hope that the opposite party may seek to reopen the 
negotiations by offering him improved terms.
104
 
 As with some of the famous passages from Smith I have discussed, Lord Ackner’s 
famous dictum reveals a different aspect when viewed more widely. In their context, Lord 
Ackner’s comments on good faith are barely connected with the issue Walford v Miles 
actually presented. In defence of an agreement to provide a period of exclusive negotiations 
with the defendant, the claimant unwisely argued for an agreement that the defendant agree to 
sell to the claimant, or give a proper reason why it did not do so to the court. But there is no 
necessary connection between an undertaking to negotiate exclusively with a party and an 
undertaking to reach agreement with that party. Lord Ackner followed the claimant in eliding 
them and rejected the resultant view of the agreement. He specifically did not believe it 
possible to “sever” the exclusivity agreement.105 Claiming that the agreement the parties had 
reached was an agreement to agree, and following the claimants in describing such an 
agreement as a “good faith” commitment to agree, Lord Ackner held that good faith should 
have no part in negotiations. He had, with respect, no need to do this, and by doing it his 
rejection of the agreement to agree as unacceptably resting on good faith blurred his rejection 
of what precisely was unacceptable about the agreement in dispute. That agreement was 
found unenforceable, not because it involved good faith, but because, in the circumstances of 
the case,
106
 it would have extinguished or unacceptably undermined the persuasive, voluntary 
quality of the sale agreement it was to facilitate. In those circumstances, and on the 
claimants’ pleadings, Lord Ackner sought to preserve the defendants’ right to withdraw from 
negotiations as protection from an agreement to agree. If his interpretation of the agreement 
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was correct, then he was right to do this. Rather than the defendants’ being bound to agree, 
Lord Ackner wanted the position to be that, in order to press negotiations to what they 
regarded as a successful conclusion, the claimants would have had to persuade the defendant 
by “offering him improved terms”. This is, I suggest, an instance of exactly what Smith had 
in mind by “setting before him a sufficient temptation”.107 
 I do not wish to argue that Lord Ackner’s approach to the particular facts of Walford v 
Miles is ultimately anything other than unclear, nor that it has been entirely helpful to the 
subsequent development of the law. He was obliged to reject Bingham LJ’s reasoning which, 
though he himself did not use the term, was based on “severance” of the exclusivity 
agreement,
108
 but one does, I am afraid, get the impression that, focusing on good faith and a 
proper reason, Lord Ackner talked past Bingham LJ. The significance of the way that 
Bingham LJ had to distinguish Walford v Miles by identifying precisely what was 
objectionable about the agreement in Courtney and Fairbairn v Tolaini - “the terms of the 
transaction were almost entirely at large”109 – is not fully appreciated. However, whether 
Bingham LJ was justified, not in generally distinguishing lock-out agreements from 
agreements to agree, but in severing a lock-out agreement from the actual collateral 
agreement reached in Walford v Miles, are two different things. If what was agreed was an 
agreement to agree, Lord Ackner’s rejection of this in the circumstances of Walford v Miles 
is, it is submitted, the preferred view.
110
 
 Where the line between an enforceable exclusivity agreement and an unenforceable 
agreement to agree should be drawn (and where various forms of agreement that the parties 
should negotiate, in connection with which “good faith” seems to have become a specific 
term of art, fall with regard to that line) need not be discussed here. I can only repeat that, as 
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Lord Ackner himself allowed, some agreements which impose bargaining restrictions serve a 
valuable commercial purpose and it is regrettable that the way he phrased his argument would 
seem to have led to his judgment obstructing the development of the law of such agreements. 
But this is not at all the point I am trying to make. The crucial point here is that, far from 
legitimating the exercise of solipsistic self-interest, Lord Ackner was seeking, in the 
circumstances of Walford v Miles, to preserve the persuasive, voluntary nature of any 
possible agreement between the parties for the sale of PNM. He may to some extent have 
been wrong in the way he went about this, but, however this is, his motivation in reaching his 
conclusion is the opposite of what it is generally taken to be. 
 One intent on underwriting solipsistic self-interest could hardly have found the 
claimants’ position in Walford v Miles unattractive, for their self-interest is a prominent 
feature of the case. We do not know how the claimants learned of PNM’s being put up for 
sale, but we do know that they themselves had no knowledge of photographic processing,
111
 
and one imagines they would quickly have sold on the business. They believed that the offer 
price “dramatically undervalued” PNM,112 and indeed their contract claim was based on the 
difference between their £2 million offer and the £3 million which they believed was the 
market value of the company.
113
 In addition to the favourable price, in the negotiations the 
claimants secured, not only the purported lock-out agreement, but a guarantee of PNM’s 
profitability which it was very unwise of the defendants to agree but which nevertheless 
should itself have been enforceable.
114
 The claimants evidently entered into these 
negotiations in the correct belief that the default rules of contractual negotiation impose no 
barrier to, indeed facilitate, seeking to gain an advantage from what a contracting party 
 
111
  Walford v Miles (HL) (n 9) 132G. 
112
 Ibid 132H. 
113
  Ibid 135D. 
114
  Ibid 132H. Apart from the relationship between the defendants and the eventual buyers, their seeking to 
avoid this guarantee may be the explanation of the defendants not concluding an agreement with the 
claimants, though they certainly feared that do so was likely to lead to dispute: ibid134A, 134D. 
 32 
 
believes is the superiority of its acumen over that of the other party. Had they clearly 
confined themselves to a lock-out agreement as a negative exclusivity agreement, the 
claimants’ further exercise of their self-interest would still have been found acceptable to the 
law of the contract. But when they very arguably tried to interpret the lock-out agreement as a 
positive agreement to agree, they pushed their self-interest too far and their conduct no longer 
was found acceptable by Lord Ackner, who sought to prevent the unacceptable undermining 
of the persuasive, voluntary nature of any resultant main agreement. If it were legitimate to 
pursue self-interest in any way other than by making misrepresentations, on what ground 
could Lord Ackner have objected to the claimant putting pressure on the defendant by an 
agreement to agree which he nevertheless found to be illegitimate and therefore 
unenforceable?  
 Lord Ackner’s famous dictum is, in the end, a very confusing, indeed, with respect, 
flatly contradictory attempt to state the ratio of his judgment. This follows from a 
misconception about the nature of, not only economic exchange, but also of contractual 
agreement. With regret and with respect, it is necessary to state baldly that this dictum is 
simply wrong about the law. It is not the law that parties to a negotiation may pursue their 
self-interest in a way which is limited only by the necessity of avoiding misrepresentations. 
In Yam Seng, Leggatt J identifies all sorts of specific duties which regulate agreement, and 
even his pathbreaking judgment does not cover all the ground. Those who simply do not 
agree that these duties regulating agreement are to be found in the English law and I must 
part company. As it happens, I would not wish to argue that these are the correct duties or 
that they should be amalgamated into a general doctrine of good faith.
115
 I do, however, wish 
to argue that the law of contract contains an extensive set of other-regarding duties 
constituting a framework for facilitating agreement, and I am of the opinion that a clear 
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understanding about this may best be reached through a concept (not a general doctrine) of 
good faith. Even if this is so, it can be only because contractual agreement is not based on 
solipsistic self-interest but on self-interest which recognises other-regarding duties. 
 
F. WALFORD v MILES AS A RELATIONAL CONTRACT 
It remains the case that the relational theory of contract which the late Ian Macneil did most 
to put on a theoretically sound foundation is generally understood as an attempt to distinguish 
a class of “relational”, or “cooperative”, contracts from “discrete”, or “competitive” 
contracts. Something like this was indeed a very important theme of Macneil’s work, and it 
has very considerable value. But an even more important theme, present from the very outset 
though Macneil himself became properly aware of it only at a relatively late stage of his 
development of the relational theory, is that all contracts are, indeed, relational, in that the 
essence of the economic exchange and the law of contract is, not the subjective choices of the 
individual parties, but the objective relationship between them recognised by the state 
through which their subjective choices are given effect. The quality of exchange and contract 
I have tried to identify as the social or other-regarding one of mutual recognition is the core 
of what Macneil was driving at in the relational theory. 
 On this basis, Macneil was able coherently to explain why the law of contract is 
constituted of doctrines which are “plainly restrictions on freedom of contract”,116 a 
puzzlingly state of affairs if that freedom is looked upon as a matter of solipsistic self-
interest. These doctrines, such as those that Lord Ackner’s famous dictum omits but on which 
Leggatt J focuses: 
appear as exceptions to some general rule permitting the parties fully to define 
their legal status [but] if the role of the law in creating contracts were more 
completely presented this distortion would not occur, and these matters would be 
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It is a sign of our current confusion that Lord Ackner’s attempt to preserve the persuasive, 
voluntary nature of agreement has been interpreted as a defence of the solipsistic self-interest 
which he himself in fact rejects, and that he no doubt understood the issue in this mistaken 
way himself. Whilst Lord Ackner was in a most important sense right to describe 
negotiations as “adversarial”, and one can admire the air of certainty he therefore gave to his 
statement of the point he was trying to make, he omitted the essential features of what he was 
trying to describe. It is, of course, pure speculation, but nevertheless reflection on the 
extremely elaborate system of rules and courtesy that govern, and so make possible, the legal 
proceedings that Lord Ackner, formerly a very distinguished advocate, may have had in mind 
when choosing the word “adversarial” perhaps makes his real meaning clear. We must come 
to terms with the fact that Walford v Miles, like all contracts, is a relational contract. 
 
G. CONCLUSION 
The disappointing reception of Leggatt J’s recognition of the existence of duties connected to 
good faith in Yam Seng is, in the end, traceable, not to explicit legal doctrine, but to the 
attitude taken by parties making a contractual agreement which is implied by those who deny 
they are implying any such attitude when interpreting such an agreement. Solipsistic self-
interest is so much regarded as legitimate or even natural that it disappears from conscious 
understanding. Such a way of understanding freedom of contract constitutes a literal 
acceptance of laissez faire which is simply unsupportable (and so is overwhelmingly hedged 
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 Within Smith scholarship, it has long not been possible credibly to attribute an 
acceptance of laissez faire of this nature to Adam Smith himself. The possible influence of 
acknowledging this on the law of contract has so far been restricted by two things in 
particular. First, Smith’s own writings on the law of contract, and indeed private law as such, 
were limited in extent and, more importantly, were theoretically limited by concepts of 
justice and especially police that heavily focused on government action understood as 
regulation in its usual sense, ie as intervention. The position taken here, that regulation (of 
which intervention is but a part) should embrace all actions by the state, including legislation 
and adjudication facilitative of economic action, simply was not Smith’s position. It of course 
implies no criticism in the pejorative sense of Smith to now maintain that this wide concept 
of regulation allows us to develop the theory of the law of contract that Smith himself could 
not develop. 
 This is particularly to be regretted because what Smith says of the exercise of economic 
self-interest is of the first importance for our understanding of the task of the law of contract 
in regulating agreement. Far from conceiving of economic self-interest as solipsistic, Smith 
intrinsically saw it as other-regarding. The recognition of both the other’s ownership of the 
goods and of the other’s power to decide to transfer them (or not), which decision therefore 
could legitimately be brought about only by persuasion, are essential to Smith’s concept of 
exchange. Though his concept of police would not allow him properly to analyse the law of 
contract as the process by which exchange is carried out, what he said of that process is best 
seen as the exercise of self-interest based on mutual recognition. 
 Leggatt J has made it much clearer than it has previously been in the case law that the 
English law of contract contains many duties which may usefully be seen as related to good 
faith. If the analysis put forward here is found persuasive, then Leggatt J’s conclusion is in 
one sense unsurprising. The law of contract exists to give legal institutional form to 
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exchange, and exchange has to be based on mutual recognition if it is to display the 
properties given for its legitimacy in economics (mutual advantage and Pareto optimisation 
through choice) and law (voluntariness of agreement through freedom of contract). It is not a 
question of limiting exploitative contracts. It is a question of what is necessary for contract 
“to exist at all”.118 As the reception of Yam Seng shows, the current situation is one in which 
the existing rules relating to good faith which are to be found in the positive law of contract 
cannot be welded into a coherent doctrine because it is thought that legitimate contractual 
self-interest is solipsistic. It is not. Rather, it is other-regarding as those existing rules indicate 
and as an explicit concept of good faith would make clear. The development of a concept of 
good faith would not be an altruistic imposition on the contractual law of agreement and the 
negotiations of contracting parties. It would be a clarification of the actual nature of the self-
interest of the contracting parties which the law of contract must facilitate. 
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